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INNOCENT PURCHASER FROM A FRAUDULENT GRANTEE OF A
DEED IN ESCROW
A deed was deposited in escrow to be delivered to the grantee
when the grantor should express her satisfaction respecting
certain land to be taken in trade. The depositary, without
authority and before performance of the condition, delivered the
deed to the grantee, by whom it was recorded and possession of
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the premises taken. The grantee thereupon conveyed the prem-
ises to a purchaser for value without notice of the foregoing
transactions. In an action by the depositor to cancel both deeds
and regain the premises, the trial court gave judgment for the
defendant. But this was reversed on appeal on the theory that
since the grantee acquired no "title" by the unauthorized
delivery, he could convey none.'
There is no question that the grantee of the deed in such a
situation acquires as against his grantor no beneficial interest
with respect to the premises.2 Such a result is generally,3 but
inaccurately,4 described by saying that the deed is absolutely void
and that the grantee acquired no "title." It is not strange, there-
fore, to find that when the problem arises whether a purchaser
from the grantee acquires any rights against the depositor, some
courts have reasoned that since no "title" passed to the grantee
he could convey none to the purchaser., But it is submitted that
such a proposition, far from being a reason, is merely an assump-
tion of the conclusion. If by "title" is meant the sum total of
legal relations that can be acquired by one with respect to a
certain piece of land, the problem to be decided in the type of
case in question is whether the ostensible grantee, though him-
self acquiring no beneficial interest, nevertheless has the power
to create in a purchaser the normal legal relations commonly
described as "title." Approaching the problem from this angle,
1 Clevenger v. Moore, 259 Pac. 219 (Okla. 1927).
2 Evans v. McKinney, 308 Il. 100, 139 N. E. 99 (1923); Sharp v. Kilborn,
64 Or. 371, 130 Pac. 735 (1913) (suit to cancel deed); 2 TIFFANY, REAL
PRoPERTY (2d ed. 1920) 1771.
If a stranger to the contract of sale performs the condition and obtains
the deed, he acquires no interest with respect to the premises. Yantis v.
Parker, 110 Okla. 195, 237 Pac. 127 (1925).
3 See Daggett v. Daggett, 143 Mass. 516, 520 (1887), where the court
said: "An unauthorized delivery by him [the depositary] of the deed
is entirely ineffectual to pass the title."
4 Cf. Blight v. Schenck, 10 Pa. 285 (1849), to the effect that the deed is
merely "voidable." See also, Neal v. Pickett, 280 S. W. 748, 750 (Tex.
Comm. App. 1926), where the depositary delivered the deed on the mistaken
belief that the condition had been fulfilled and the court said that the
delivery might not be wholly without effect.
Assuming that by "void" is meant that the transaction could have no
legal effect whatever, it would seem clear that this is a misdescription of
the situation. Thus in Connell v. Connell, 32 W. Va. 329, 9 S. E. 252
(1889), it was held that a grantor could not deny the validity of an un-
authorized delivery of a deed which had been recorded eighteen years
previously and of which he had knowledge. To the same effect, see Weg-
horst v. Clark, 66 Colo. 535, 539, 180 Pac. 742, 744 (1919) ; 2 TIFFANY, loc.
cit. supra note 2.
5Tyler v. Cate, 29 Or. 515, 45 Pac. 800 (1896); Dixon v. Bristol Sav.
Bank, 102 Ga. 461, 31 S. E. 96 (1897); Forcum v. Brown, 251 I1. 301, 96
N. E. 259 (1911); 1 DEvLIN, DEsws (3d ed. 1911) § 322; 21 C. J. 885, § 31.
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there seems to be little doubt that if the purchaser has notice of
the preceding facts, he is under a disability to acquire "title." r
The further problem then arises whether an innocent pur-
chaser for value is under a like disabilty. And this in turn
depends upon the connotation ascribed to "innocent purchaser."
A few cases, often referred to as holding that a purchaser
acquires no "title" because his vendor had none, assume that "an
innocent purchaser" is involved.7  But it is believed that an
examination of the facts of those cases will disclose a reasonable
basis for holding that the purchaser was put on inquiry. Those
courts seem to have entirely overlooked the fact that the original
grantor was in possession of the premises at the time of the
attempted re-sale. Where a controversy arises out of a trans-
action other than an escrow transaction, such possession, by
one asserting an interest in opposition to those thought to be
acquired by the purchaser, is often held to put the purchaser on
notice.8 And no sufficient reason appears to require a different
result where an escrow transaction is involved. It would seem,
therefore, that many cases often cited for the proposition that
an innocent purchaser acquires no "title" do not in fact so hold.
Where the grantee is in possession at the time of the re-sale,
as in the instant case, and there are no other facts which put
6 Bergstom v. Pickett, 148 Minn. 224, 181 N. W. 343 (1921) ; Wilson v.
Biles, 171 Ark. 912, 287 S. W. 373 (1926); Tyler v. Cates, smpra note 5;Weghorst v. Clark, supra note 4.
T Bingham v. Taylor, 12 F. (2d) 15 (C. C. A. 5th, 1926); Wood v.
French, 39 Okla. 685, 136 Pac. 734 (1913) ; Dixon v. Bristol Savings Bank,
supra note 5; Jackson v. Lynn, 94 Iowa 151, 62 Pac. 701 (1895). The
above cases all rely on Everts v. Agnes, 4 Wis. 343 (1855), which involved
an innocent purchaser for value whom the court refused to protect. The
ground of that decision was the orthodox notion that one who himself has
acquired no "title" can convey none.
8 Where a person purchases what appears to be a clear title, but in fact
is not, possession by one asserting the adverse claim is notice thereof.
Kirby v. Tallmadge, 160 U. S. 379 (1896) ; Phelan v. Brady, 119 N. Y. 587,
23 N. E. 1109 (1890); see Olmstead v. McCrory, 158 Wis. 323, 324, 148
N. W. 871, 872 (1914). There is a conflict as to whether possession by a
previous owner, who asserts an equitable interest is sufficient to put a
purchaser from his grantee on inquiry. That the purchaser is put on
inquiry is held in Pell v. McElroy, 36 Cal. 268 (1868) (vendor's lien);
Ronan v. Bluhm, 173 III. 277, 50 N. E. 694 (1898) (grantor's right of res-
cission); Ludowese v. Amidon, 124 Blinn. 288, 144 N. W. 9G5 (1914)
(grantor's right of rescission). But see MlcEwen v. Keary, 178 Mich. 0, 9,
144 N. W. 524, 525 (1913) ; Trulin v. Plested, 178 Iowa, 220, 223, 159 N. W.
633, 634 (1916). The two latter cases at most contain only dicta to the
effect that possession by the original owner is presumed to be as a tenant
at will. But they are both distinguishable by the fact that reasonable
inquiry was made by the sub-vendee and no information of equitable
interests obtained. The view first stated is favored by text-writers. 2
T=Ai rY, op. cit. supra note 2, at 2239; 2 DEvLIN, 0p. cit. stpra note 5,
§ 764.
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the purchaser on notice, it is very generally held that he has
acquired the "title." 1 The notion which motivates courts so to
act is that although the depositor and the purchaser are both
innocent, the former has put it in the power of the wrongdoer
to cause the loss.10 Everts v. Agnes 1 is one of the few cases 12
which hold otherwise on their facts. Because that decision has
been largely relied on and extensively cited by those cases which
have denied protection to purchasers who might readily be said
to have been on notice, the impression is given that it represents
the prevailing view. And the instant decision may have resulted
to a large extent from such an erroneous assumption.
THE EFFECT OF NON-RECOGNITION ON STATE PROPERTY.
The continued non-recognition of Soviet Russia has presented
to our courts the difficult problem of disposing of the property
and claims of the old regime. The recent case of Lehigh Valley
R. R. v. State of Russia, 21 F. (2d) 396 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927), con-
cerned a claim for munitions belonging to the Russian Imperial
Government, which, on July 30, 1916, were destroyed in a fire
and explosion in the freight yards of the Lehigh Valley Railroad
at Black Tom Island, near Jersey City. The bill of lading under
which the munitions had been shipped required that suit for
their loss be brought within two years. In March, 1917, the
Imperial Government fell from power, to be succeeded by the
Provisional Government, which in November was supplanted by
the Soviet Republic. On July 23, 1918, suit was instituted for
the loss of the munitions, the plaintiff being entitled the "Russian
Government." The suit was authorized by Boris Balhmetieff,
who on July 5, 1917 had been recognized by the State Depart-
ment as the accredited ambassador of the Russian Provisional
Government. No other Russian government has since been
recognized. Bakhmetieff retired in 1922, and the custody of the
property for which he was responsible was certified by the
State Department to vest in Ughet, his financial attach6. Since
1919 the defendant has made several motions to abate the action,
9 Mays v. Shields, 117 Ga. 814, 45 S. E. 68 (1903); Quick v. Milligan,
108 Ind. 419, 9 N. E. 392 (1886); Shurtz v. Colvin, 55 Ohio St. 274, 45
N. E. 527 (1896); Simson v. Bank of Commerce, 43 Hun. 156 (N. Y.
1887); Bailey v. Krim, Fed. Cas. No. 734 (C. C. Ind. 1879); Haven
v. Kramer, 41 Iowa 382 (1875) ; Blight v. Schenk, 10 Pa. 285 (1849) ; see
Hubbard v. Greeley, 84 Me. 340, 343, 24 Atl. 799, 799 (1892).
10 See Quick v. Milligan, supra note 9, at 422, 9 N. E. at 394; Shurtz v.
Colvin, supra note 9, at 277, 45 N. E. at 529.
21 Supra note 7.
12 Houston v. Forman, 109 So. 297 (Fla. 1926); Schmidt v. Musson, 20
S. D. 389, 107 N. W. 367 (1906).
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on the ground that there was no proper plaintiff therein.1 In
1923 the District Court upheld the right of the plaintiff to sue,
and granted a motion to change the name of the plaintiff to the
"State of Russia." 2 Pending an appeal, a motion for a writ of
prohibition to prevent further proceedings was denied by the
Supreme Court.3 On August 8, 1927 the Circuit Court of Appeals
affarmed the judgment of the District Court, which in 1925 had
rendered a verdict of $854,876.37 for the plaintiff. The case was
finally disposed of on December 12, 1927, when the Supreme
Court denied a petition for a writ of certiorari.4
The court faced the dilemma of permitting the suit to continue,
the Russian State being represented by a person attached to a
government defunct for ten years, or of permitting the period
of limitations to run in the defendant's favor because of the
lack of a proper party plaintiff. They chose the former alterna-
tive. This is not the first time that our courts have admitted the
distinction between State and Government and sought to save
State property, though the prevailing de facto government was
unrecognized. In the Oliver Trading Company Case, property of
the Mlexican Consulate in New York was attached, in connec-
tion with a suit against the Mlexican National Railways, a state-
owned corporation. The Obregon Government was then un-
recognized. At the request of the Mexican Consul, the State
Department advised the court, through the Governor of New
York, that the Mexican State had been recognized by the United
States for many decades, and that, though the then government
was unrecognized, the court might well lift the attachment from
property of the Mexican State. This was done. In the instant
case, property of the Russian State as plaintiff was preserved
by a more awkward expedient.
In past cases the continued recognition of Bakhmetieff and
Ughet by the State Department, though their government was
defunct, has given them a standing in court., As was suggested
in the lower court,7 this recognition may have been accorded in
order that they might preserve Russian State property. Neither
the upper nor the lower court, however, gave any indication of
what was to be the ultimate destination of the proceeds of the
suit." Several motions were made by representatives of the
I Russian Gov't v. Lehigh Valley R. R, 293 Fed. 133 (S. D. N. Y. 1919).
2Russian Gov't v. Lehigh Valley R. R., 293 Fed. 135 (S. D. N. Y. 1923).
'Ex parte Lehigh Valley R. R., 265 U. S. 573, 44 Sup. Ct. 40 (1924).
4 New York Herald Tribune, Dec. 13, 1927, at 12.
5 Oliver Trading Co. v. Gov't of U. S. of Mexico, U. S. Sup. Ct. Record,
p. 33 (1924).
B The Rodgai, 278 Fed. 294 (N. D. Cal. 1920); cf. Agency of Canadian
Car Co. v. American Can Co., 258 Fed. 363 (C. C. A. 2d, 1919).
7Russian Gov't v. Lehigh Valley R. R., supra note 2, at 138.
8 Hence it was suggested that a receiver should have been appointed.
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Soviet Republic for the appointment of a custodian thereof. The
last of these was dismissed on November 25, 1927, when it
appeared that Ughet had entered into an arrangement with the
Treasury Department to pay over the proceeds to the Treasury
of the United States, in part payment of debts" due from the
State of Russia to the United States. Such a disposition seems
highly satisfactory. In effect, the United States becomes custo-
dian of the fund, which stands to the credit of the next Russian
Government to be recognized. An adjustment between this
credit and the debts incurred by past governments will neces-
sarily be effected when such recognition takes place.
EFFECTS OF IRREGULAR ATTEMPTS TO CREATE * CORPORATE SHARES
Does an attempt by a corporation to create shares for the
purpose of performing a contract "in restraint of trade" and
therefore, in violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, result in
the creation of such shares? The recent case of In re Sutherland 1
held that it did. Suit was brought by the Alien Property Custo-
dian, who, proceeding under the authority of a war-time act,
claimed that an alien enemy was the owner of certain common
shares in the Eastman Kodak Company, and demanded that the
corporation cancel the shares of such alien, and issue and deliver
to the custodian new certificates in their place. This the
Eastman Kodak Company refused to do, asserting that the shares
in question were never in existence, because the attempt to create
them was in performance of a contract to prevent competition.2
(1927) 41 HARV. L. REv. 102; of. Dickinson, The Unrecognized Govcrnment
or State in English and American Law (1923) 22 MICH. L. R1v. 118, 124.
This was done in an English case. See Archangel Saw Mills v. Baring
Bros., 91 L. J. Ch. 326, 331 (1921).
*This comment speaks of "creating" shares rather than of "issuing"
shares, as the term "issue" suggests the transference by the corporation
to a person of something already in existence. The reifying of this concept,
"share," the picturing of "shares" as already in existence in the coffers of
the corporation before the legal relations connoted by the term have been
created in a particular person, has contributed to a deal of muddy think-
ing, especially in the field of so-called "treasury shares." "Share" is merely
a convenient shorthand term expressing an aggregate of existing legal
relations, e.g., right to vote, to dividends, to examine corporate books, duty
to pay calls or assessments and so forth.
321 F. (2d) 667 (W. D. N. Y. 1927).
2 The alien corporation gave to the Eastman Kodak Company the exclu-
sive privilege of using a secret process for manufacturing collodian paper
and agreed not to manufacture or deal in collodian papers in Great Britain
or North America for one hundred years. The court here assumed for
the purposes of its discussion that the contract was illegal. It should per-
haps be pointed out that such a contract would very likely not be held
to be illegal. Tode v. Gross, 127 N. Y. 480, 28 N. E. 469 (1891); Norden-
felt v, Maxim Nordenfelt Guns Co., Ltd. [1894] A. C. 535.
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The court said: "If the contract is in fact illegal, its illegality
did not follow the stock to the extent of depriving the owner of
its interest in the corporation." The court then decreed that
the certificates should be issued by the defendant corporation as
requested.
The exact fact situation suggested by the instant case does
not appear to have been considered before. Is the result reached
by the court desirable? Is it warranted by the sole fact that the
acts contemplated by the contract under consideration had been
executed? In view of the lack of precedent on the particular
point at issue, it would seem desirable to compare the decisions
in somewhat analogous situations where there is involved some
irregularity in the attempt of a corporation to create shares.
A corporation may attempt to create shares in excess of the
capital stock authorized by its articles of association or a limit-
ing statute. The. certificates which it issues, however, though
purporting to represent shares are wholly ineffective to create
the legal incidents of shareholdership. The corporation may
cancel such certificates whether in the hands of a purchaser with
notice or without notice.3 Conversely, the holder of "over-issued
shares" can not be compelled by either the corporation or its
creditors to pay the unpaid balance of his subscription, nor is he
under the responsibility of a shareholder to creditors for the
unpaid portion of the par value of his shares. He may, more-
over, have restitution of his consideration even where creditors
of the corporation intervene5
Some few courts, similarly, hold that attempts to create shares
in return for over-valued property or for property not "legal"
payment under a statute or constitutional provision are wholly
inoperative, regardless of the identity of the parties, or the pur-
pose of the action.6
3 Crawford v. Twin City Oil Co., 113 So. 61 (Ala. 1927); Smith v.
Worcester Ry., 224 Mass. 564, 113 N. E. 462 (1916); People v. Parker
Vein Coal Co., 10 How. Prac. 543 (N. Y. 1854).
4 Ross-Meehan Shoe Foundry Co. v. Malleable Iron Co., 72 Fed. 957
(E. D. Tenn. 1896); Scovill v. Thayer, 105 U. S. 143 (1881).
5 Trapp v. R. R. Men's Refining Co., 114 Kan. 618, 220 Pac. 249 (1923) ;
Pruitt v. Oklahoma Steam Baking Co., 39 Okla. 509, 135 Pac. 130 (1913);
Standard Lithographing Co. v. Motor Speedway Co., 140 Minn. 240, 167
N. W. 796 (1918); Heide v. Capital Securities Co., 200 Ala. 397, '76 So.
313 (1917); Willis v. Fry, 13 Phila. 33 (Pa. 1879). Codtra: Banigan v.
Bard, 134 U. S. 291, 10 Sup. Ct. 565 (1890) (holder of "over-issued shares"
-who with knowledge of over-issue has permitted himself to be treated as a
shareholder for years may not counterclaim against creditors for money
paid for shares).
60verlock v. Portland Mining Co., 243 Pac. 400 (Ariz. 1926) (bona fide
transferee for value of certificates issued for worthless mining claim in an
attempt to create shares subject to cancellation of certificates by corpora-
tion) ; Walton v. Standard Drilling Co., 43 S. D. 576, 181 N. W. 96 (1921)
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The vast majority of courts, however, have not, except in the
case of an over-issue, rendered entirely null attempts to create
shares in an irregular or illegal manner. Such an attempt is
ineffective in that it is usually held that illegally issued certifi-
cates in the hands of a purchaser or transferee with notice are
subject to cancellation at the instance of a prejudiced share-
holder.7 And even a holder with notice of such certificates has a
defense to an action by the corporation to collect the unpaid
balance of the subscription, or for assessments on the alleged
shares for the unpaid portion of their par value.8 There is con-
(cancellation of certificates in hands of transferee without notice where
certificates had been issued for property without required valuation by
directors) ; Lee v. Cameron, 67 Okla. 80, 169 Pac. 17 (1917) (certificates
issued for less than par value in an attempt to create shares cancelled
whether in hands of transferee with notice or without notice); First Avenue
Land Co. v. Parker, 111 Wis. 1, 86 N. W. 604 (1901) (shares attempted to
be created without consideration do not create shareholdership in pur-
chaser without notice); Comment (1922) 31 YALE LAW JOUnNAL 883.
7 Caldwell Producing Co. v. Menefee, 240 S. W. 1023 (Tex. Civ. App,
1922) (shares attempted to be created without consideration); James v.
Stiefer Mining Co., 35 Cal. App. 778, 171 Pac. 117 (1918) (attempt to
create shares in return for worthless land); Copper Iing Mining Co. v.
Hanson, 52 Utah 605, 176 Pac. 623 (1918) (attempt to create shares in
return for over-valued property); Northwest Mfg. Co. v. French, 44 S. D.
195, 183 N. W. 117 (1921) (attempt to create shares without considera-
tion).; Trask v. Chase, 107 Me. 137, 77 Atl. 698 (1910) (attempt to create
shares with purpose of securing control cancelled at instance of prejudiced
shareholders who had been deprived of pre-emptive rights to subscribe
thereto) ; Spena v. Goffe, 112 Kan. 693, 212 Pac. 1093 (1923) (shares
attempted to be created without having valuation of property given in
return approved by commissioner'as required by statute); Bowen v. Im-
perial Theatres, 6 Del. Ch. 120, 115 At]. 918 (1922). (corporation could
not be compelled to recognize as shareholder purchaser with notice that
certificates had been issued in attempt to create shares for sufficient consi-
deration). Contra: Latkin v. Maclellan, 140 Md. 570, 118 Atl. 181 (1922)
(on ground that statute requiring filing of statement that certificates had
been issued was intended to penalize officers and not purchasers of shares).
8 Crumley v. Crumley Business College, 120 Or. 306, 252 Pac. 85 (1927)
(shares attempted to be created for over-valued property) ; Farm Products
Co. v. Jordan, 229 Mich. 235, 201 N. W. 198 (1924) (violation of Blue
Sky Law); Reilly v. Clyne, 27 Ariz. 432, 234 Pac. 35 (1925) (violation of
Blue Sky Law); Tramp v. Marquesen, 188 Iowa 968, 176 N. W. 917
(1920) (attempt to create shares for less than par value).; Courtney v
Georgia, 228 Fed. 859 (C. C. A. 2d, 1915) (attempt to create shares for
less than par); Marion Trust Co. v. Barnett, 169 Ind. 346, 82 N. E. 782
(1907). (attempt to create shares without consideration); Union Ry. v.
Sneed, 99 Tenn. 1, 41 S. W. 364 (1897) (failure to register amendment
authorizing increase of capital stock) ; Parmelee v. Price, 208 Ill. 544, 70
N. E. 725 (1904) (fraudulent overvaluation of property taken in return
for shares attempted to be created); Arnold v. Searing, 78 N. J. Eq. 146,
78 Atl. 762 (1910) (attempt to create "bonus shares") ; St. Louis Charcoal
Co. v. Moore, 178 Mo. App. 692, 162 S. W. 745 (1914) (attempt to create
shares for less than par).
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flict, however, as to whether one, who was a party to the illegal
acts complained of or a purchaser with knowledge thereof, may
offer to tender back the certificates issued to him, and recover
from a solvent corporation the money paid it for such certifi-
cates. 9 But when the rights of a creditor of the corporation
are involved, it is clear that the purchaser with notice of illegally
issued certificates may not have restitution of his consideration.20
Moreover, a purchaser or transferee with notice may be com-
pelled to pay the unpaid balance of the subscription price, or the
unpaid portion of the par value of his shares, where it is illegal
either by statute or common law to attempt to create shares for
less than par value. 1 Similarly, he is under the statutory
9 Recovery allowed: Taylor v. Lounsbury Co., 137 AtL 159 (Conn. 1927)
(failure to file certificate that there had been a shareholders' meeting to
authorize the creation of shares); Matthews v. Columbia Nat. Bank, 79
Fed. 558 (D. Wash. 1897) (failure of proposed increase of shares to become
effective because not subscribed for in full); Lincoln v. New Orleans E p.
Co., 45 La. Ann. 729, 12 So. 937 (1893) (failure to file statement that
articles of association has been amended to increase amount of authorized
capital stock); Life Ins. Co. v. Pearson, 188 S. W. 513 (Tex. Cir. App.
1916) (shares attempted to be created in return for notes, secured by
deed in trust, not payment under terms of constitution); Congress Spring
Co. v. Knowlton, 103 U. S. 49 (1880) (shares attempted to be created for less
than par value); Douglass v. Kavanaugh, 90 Fed. 373 (C. C. A. 6th, 1893)
(attempt to issue to one person certificates for more shares than he could
hold under statute). Contre: Thermussen v. Continental Trust Co., 15 F.
(2d) 895 (D. C. 1926) (on ground that provision against payment for
shares with notes was not for benefit of offending purchaser); Domenigoni
v. Imperial Live Stock Co., 189 Cal. 467, 209 Pac. 36 (1922) (shares
-attempted to be created on terms permitting payment of less than twenty
per cent cash as required by commissioner); Thronson v. Universal Mfg.
Co., 164 Wis. 44, 159 N. W. 575 (1916) (shares attempted to be created
for less than par value in violation of constitution). The writer is inclined
to favor the view that permits recovery. The argument usually advanced
by the courts refusing recovery is that the holder of the certificates and
the corporation are in pari delicto. But this contention does not seem
persuasive, since the certificates in question are subject to cancellation by
the corporation at the instance of a prejudiced shareholder. Supra note 7.
And when this is done the holder of the certificates receives back the con-
sideration given for them. Furthermore, the effect of allowing all holders
of illegally issued certificates to maintain an action for restitution from
the corporation would seem to make more effective the attempt of the
legislature to control the creation of shares by corporations. Such a
result would seem desirable where the rights of creditors are not involved.
1 oIn re Romback Co., 9 F. (2d) 359 (C. C. A. 3d, 1925) (failure to give
proper notice to shareholders of meeting to authorize creation of shares) ;
McWhirter v. First State Bank, 182 S. W. 682 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910)
(shares created in return for promissory notes contrary to constitutional
provision).
n Rubber Tire Supply Co. v. American Utilities Co., 279 S. W. 751 (Mo.
App. 1926); Herron Co. v. Shaw, 45 Cal. 734, 133 Pac. 488 (1913); See v.
Heppenheimer, 69 N. J. Eq. 36, 61 Atl. 843 (1915); Dieterle v. Ann Arbor
Paint Co., 143 Mich. 416, 107 N. W. 79 (1906); Allen v. Grant, 122 Ga.
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responsibility of a shareholder with respect to further assess-
ments on such shares.12
Where certificates for shares, though issued in an illegal or
irregular manner, are in the hands of a purchaser or transferee
without notice, however, he may claim all the legal incidents of
shareholdership. The shares cannot be cancelled by the corpora-
tion.13  He can compel the corporation to recognize him as a
shareholder on its books. ' Such a holder is free from responsi-
bility either to the corporation or its creditors arising out of
the fact that the certificates have been issued in violation of a
statute forbidding the creation of shares at less than par value."u
552, 50 S. E. 494 (1905) ; Lloyd v. Preston, 146 U. S. 630, 13 Sup. Ct. 131
(1892); Mountain Lake Land Co. v. Blair, 109 Va. 147, 63 S. E. 751
(1909); Rhode v. Dock Hop Co., 184 Cal. 367, 194 Pac. 11 (1920); Davis v.
Scott, 129 Ark. 226, 195 S. W. 383 (1917); Rowan v. Texas Orchard Co.,
181 S. W. 871 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916); Holcombe v. Trenton White City
Co., 80 N. J. Eq. 122, 82 Atl. 618 (1912), aff'd 82 N. J. Eq. 364, 91 Atl. 1069
(1913); Elyton Land Co. v. Birmingham Warehouse Co., 92 Ala. 407, 9
So. 129 (1891); Veeder v. Mudgett, 95 N. Y. 295 (1884). But of. Handley
v. Stutz, 139 U. S: 417, 11 Sup. Ct. 530 (1891) (making an exception where a
financially embarrassed corporation, in order to raise urgently needed funds,
offered shares for less than par as inducement to purchasers).
12 Scott v. Dewese, 181 U. S. 202, 21 Sup. Ct. 585 (1901) (shares created
although the total amount of the proposed increase had not been subscribed
for as required); Commissioner v. Cosmopolitan Trust Co., 253 Mass. 205,
148 N. E. 609 (1925) (attempt to create shares not approved by vote of
majority of shares).
.3 Weniger v. Success Mining Co., 227 Fed. 549 (C. C. A. 8th, 1915)
(prejudiced shareholder cannot recover or compel cancellation of shares
created to replace his shares improperly cancelled); Southern Mut. Aid
Ass'n v. Blount, 112 Va. 214, 70 S. E. 487 (1911) (shares created for con-
sideration growing out of scheme to suppress bidding at public sale); of.
Winters v. Lindsay, 52 Cal. App. 93, 198 Pac. 43 (1921) (innocent pur-
chaser of shares attempted to be created for less than par is a shareholder
and not entitled to damages from transferor) ; see Taylor v. Citizens 0il
Co., 182 Ky. 350, 362, 206 S. W. 644, 650 (1918) (prejudiced shareholder
cannot secure cancellation of shares created for overvalued property).
14 Westminister Nat. Bank v. Electrical Works, 73 N. H. 465, 62 Atl. 971
(1906) (corporation compelled to recognize as shareholder transferee with-
out notice of certificates issued without consideration); Appeal of Kistor-
bock, 127 Pa. 601, 18 At]. 381 (1889) (pledgee without notice of certificates
fraudulently issued by president of corporation can, on pledgor's failure
to redeem pledge, compel recognition as shareholder); Krall v. Lebanon
Valley Savings Ass'n, 277 Pa. 440, 121 Atl. 405 (1923) (officer embezzled
payment); Green v. Caribon Oil Co., 179 Cal. 787, 178 Pac. 950 (1919)
(shares fraudulently created by officers).
15 Feehan v. Kendrick, 32 Idaho 220, 179 Pac. 507 (1919) ; Rhode v. Dock
Hop Co., supra note 12; Rich v. Park, 177 S. W. 184 (Tex. Civ. App.
1915) ; Babbitt v. Read, 215 Fed. 395 (D. C. 1914), af]'d 236 Fed. 42 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1916); Cooney Co. v. Arlington Hotel, 9 Del. Ch. 137, 101 Atl. 879
(1917) ; Sherman v. Oil Co., 185 Cal. 554, 197 Pac. 799 (1921) ; Grimsmore
v. Kendrick, 42 Idaho 491, 247 Pac. 746 (1926); Davies v. Ball, 64 Wash.
292, 116 Pac. 833 (1911). Contra: Shugart v. Maytag, 188 Iowa 916,
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And if he disaffirms prior to insolvency of the corporation he
may recover such damages as he may have suffered by virtue of
the transaction.6 Such innocent purchaser or transferee, how-
ever, if he has not disaffirmed prior to insolvency, cannot recover
against creditors 17 and is moreover subject to the statutory
"double liability" of a shareholder. 8
The cases would seem to indicate that, excluding the situation
where there is an over-issue, it is misleading to speak in terms
of the general validity of shares attempted to be created in an
illegal manner. At best it is but possible to predict the result
of a contest between certain parties on a particular question.
In the case of in re Stztherlwd 19 the suit was by the Custodian
in the place of a purchaser with notice of the illegality of the
contract under which certificates were issued to it. The ques-
tion, then, is whether a purchaser with notice in such a situation
can compel the corporation to recognize him as a shareholder,
and the decision of the court would seem contrary to the holdings
in other cases where there was some irregularity in the attempt
to create shares and a similar question was involved.
There do not appear to be any considerations of policy, or any
precedents 20 that would warrant a different result in the cases
176 N. W. 886 (1920) (all holders of shares responsible by statute for
unpaid portion of par value).
16 Edwards v. Ioor, 205 Mich. 617, 172 N. W. 620 (1919) (violation of
Blue Sky Law); Landweler v. Lingenfelder, 249 S. W. 723 (Mo. 1923)
(violation of Blue Sky Law); N. Y. N. H. & H. R. R. v. Schuyler, 34 N. Y.
30 (1865) (attempt of officer to create shares fraudulently) ; Greensburg
Title Co. v. Aspinwall Co., 266 Pa. 160, 109 Atl. 631 (1920) (fraudulent
attempt of officer to create shares). See cases supra note 9.
17 In re Romback Co., supra note 11. This view would also seem to be
supported by dicta in many of the cases.
Is Scott v. Dewese, supra note 13.
19 Supra note 1. See also, supra note 2 as to the illegality of the
contract.
20 The court in the instant case seems to have relied on a statement in
the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Harriman v. Northern
Securities Co., 197 U. S. 244, 25 Sup. Ct. 493 (1905), the only other case
that the writer has found in which shares were attempted to be created
under a contract in restraint of trade. The passage quoted is at page
295, 25 Sup. Ct. at 504, as follows: "In acquiring the securities stock,
complainants acquired the ordinary rights of stockholders . . ." It is
believed that the statement is pure dictum, and, furthermore, that the
Harriman case may be distinguished from the instant case on its fact-.
Harriman and other shareholders of two competing railroads transferred
to the Securities Company, a holding corporation, enough shares to secure
control of both railroads in return for shares of equal value from the
Securities Company. In an action by the United States this transaction
was declared to be in restraint of trade, and a decree was issued that the
railroad shares should not be accorded voting power or the right to receive
dividends while they were in the possession of the Securities Company.
The court refused to order the Securities Company to return the railroad
367
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of shares attempted to be created under a contract in restraint
of trade from that reached in cases where there has been a
failure to comply with some specific statutory requirement with
respect to the creation of shares. The guilty corporation may
perhaps be punished by quo warranto proceedings, but it would
seem undesirable to have that as the sole penalty. 1  It would
seem equally undesirable to hold that the other party to the con-
tract became a shareholder for all purposes, and thus allow the
contract to be given effect. It is submitted, rather, that the
attempt to create shares under a contract in restraint of trade
should be given the effect usually given to attempts to create
shares in an irregular manner when an over-issue is not involved.
The language of the court in the instant case would seem, there-
fore, erroneous.
PROTECTION OF MEMBERSHIP IN VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS
It cannot be doubted that a wide discretion should be given
to voluntary associations to manage their internal affairs. That
the personal relationships involved and the discipline necessary
for internal harmony can best be regulated by such an organi-
zation itself is well recognized.1 As a result, it is usually said
that the courts will accept as conclusive the decision of an as-
sociation tribunal except in cases involving a property right.2
shares to their previous holders, however, because it did not have those
parties before it and felt, therefore, that it could not compel them to
surrender the shares of the Securities Company for the railroad shares.
The Securities Company, thereupon, with Harriman's acquiescence, dis-
tributed or sold to purchasers for value the railroad shares in question.
Harriman then brought this action to compel the Securities Company to
return to him the railroad shares he had transferred to it. The court said
that Harriman's laches and acquiescence would under the circumstances
prevent recovery. It appeared, moreover, that to deliver back the railroad
shares to the Harriman interests would itself be contrary to the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act and the purposes of the previous suit by the United States,
There is nothing in the actual decision of that case which would support
the decision in the instant case. On the contrary the court seemed disposed
to favor whatever steps were necessary to nullify the effect of the contract
in restraint of trade.
21 Comment (1927) 37 YALE LAW JOURNAL237.
1 See Del Ponte v. Societa di Marconi, 27 R. I. 1, 6, 7, 60 Atl. 237, 240
(1905); United States v. Metropolitan Club, 11 App. D. C. 180, 199 (1897).
2State v. Landnehr, 261 S. W. 699 (Mo. App. 1924); Rogers v. Tangier
Temple A. A., 112 Neb. 166, 198 N. W. 873 (1924). See Lawson v. Howell,
118 Cal. 613, 619, 50 Pac. 763, 764 (1897), where the court said: "Organiza-
tions of this character are not recognized ... as entitled to recognition in
courts for the enforcement of their rules unless there is involved also the
determination of some civil right or some right of property."
Membership in a political party involves no property right to give the
courts jurisdiction. McKane v. Adams, 123 N. Y. 609 (1890),; Kearns v.
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It is here proposed to examine first, the extent to which courts
will interfere when such a "proferty right" is present and,
second, the types of interests which are protected under this
term.
It is to be noted, in the first place, that though actions at law
for damages are occasionally prosecuted, the relief usually sought
is of an equitable character. It is well settled, in any case, that
the courts will not review the merits of a decision by an as-
sociation tribunal but will limit themselves to examining the
fairness of its procedure.3 If the association has acted mala fide
or so arbitrarily as to violate its rules regarding discipline, a
court may order reinstatement or a new hearing." Some courts
refuse to pass upon the reasonableness of the regulations of an
association, arguing that by becoming a member, the individual
has agreed to submit himself to them, however unreasonable and
arbitrary they may be.5 Mlost jurisdictions, however, have de-
manded that a fair hearing be given before expulsion, and have
Howley, 188 Pa. 116, 41 Atl. 273 (1898). For a discussion of the jurisdic-
tion of courts of equity over unincorporated associations, see Note (1922)
7 CORN. L. Q. 26L
3 Commonwealth v. Union League, 135 Pa. 301, 19 At]. 1030 (1890);
Connelly v. Masonic Mutual Beneficial Ass'n, 58 Conn. 552, 20 At]. 671
(1890); Lawson v. Hewell, supra note 2; Richards v. Morrison, 229 Mass.
458, 118 N. E. 868 (1918). It was said in Lawson v. Hewell, -,pra note
2 at 619, 50 Pac. at 164: ". . . and in these cases courts are limited to
inquiring whether the rules prescribed by the organization for the determin-
ing of the right have been followed." And in the Union League Case, oppra
at 327, 19 Atl. at 1035, "The Courts entertain jurisdiction to heep these
tribunals in the line of order and to correct abuses but they do not inquire
into the merits of what has passed inr em judicatum." And see Brown v.
Harris County Medical Society, 194 S. W. 1179, 1180 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917)
-where the court said: "... in such cases the courts never interfere except
to ascertain -whether or not the proceeding was pursuant to the rules and
laws of the society, whether or not it -was in good faith, and whether or not
there was anything in it in violation of the laws of the land.'
4 Bartlett v. Bartlett, 116 Wis. 450, 93 N. W. 473 (1903); Taboada v.
Sociedad Espanole de Beneficencia Mutua, 191 Cal. 187, 215 Pac. 673
(1923); see Otto v. Journeymen's Tailor's Protective & Benev. Union, 75
Cal. 308, 314, 17 Pac. 217, 219 (1888). Where a by-law of the association
requires that notice of the charges be given a member, courts do not hesi-
tate to act if such notice has not been given. State v. Cateret Club, 40
N. J. L. 295 (1878); People v. Musical Mutual Protective Union, 118 N. Y.
101, 23 N. E. 129 (1889) ; Byram v. Sovereign Camp of Woodmen, 108 Iowa
430, 79 N. W. 144 (1899). A total lack of evidence to support the expul-
sion was said to be so arbitrary as to invalidate an expulsion. See People
v. N. Y. Prod. Exch., 149 N. Y. 401, 413, 44 N. E. 84, 87 (189G). The
e-xpulsion of a member may be declared invalid, if the tribunal is shown
to have been biased. Wilcox v. Supreme Council of the Royal Arcanum,
210 N. Y. 370, 104 N. E. 624 (1914). For a discussion of these matters,
see WRIGHTINGTON, UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS (1910) § 5G.
See Lawson v. Hewell, supra note 2 at 619, 50 Pac. at 764; Pitcher v.
Board of Trade, 121 Ill. 412, 421 (1887).
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declared an arbitrary regulation void.( And if there is no pro-
vision insuring notice and a fair hearing, courts often insert such
a requirement.7  While it is difficult to discover any well defined
rule in the cases, the result throughout has been to prevent any
unjust deprivation of certain interests incidental to membership
in such organizations."
An examination of those interests usually protected as amount-
ing to a "property right" suggests the query whether the desire
of the courts to prevent a member from suffering unjustly the
humiliation and injury to his character which usually attend
expulsion from such organizations is not in itself a potent reason
for taking jurisdiction. It is evident that such an interest is
essentially personal in nature. Consequently, in granting equi-
table relief, particularly, a court must face, in addition to the
necessity of allowing a wide discretion to association tribunals,
the much voiced limitation that "equity will not protect purely
personal rights." 9 It has been pointed out that the restriction
is an unsound one and that, in a great many cases, equity has
protected personal rights under the guise of a fictitious or nom-
inal "property right." 'o In suggesting that this is also true of
6Ludowski v. Polish Roman Catholic Sec., 29 Mo. App. 337 (1888);
Berkhout v. Supreme Council Royal Arcanum, 62 N. J. L. 103, 43 Atl. 1
(1899) ; Gilmore v. Palmer, 109 Misc. 552, 179 N. Y. Supp. 1 (Sup. Ct. Sp.
T. 1919).
Where a by-law of a trade union infringed upon a privilege guaranteed
by the state constitution to petition the legislature, the by-law was declared
void and a member expelled thereunder was reinstated. Spayd v. Ringling
Rock Lodge, 270 Pa. 67, 113 Atl. 70 (1921); See Note (1922) 35 IIARV. L.
Rov. 332.
7 Grassi Bros. v. O'Rourke, 89 Misc. 234, 153 N. Y. Supp. 493 (Sup. Ct.
Sp. T. 1915); Universal Lodge v. Valentine, 134 Md. 505, 107 Atl.
531 (1919). Some courts, notably those of England, require that the
proceedings must not violate the "rules of natural justice." Von Arx v.
San Francisco Gruetli Verein, 113 Cal. 377, 45 Pac. 685 (1896); Fisher v.
Keane, 11 Ch. D. 353 (1879); Labouchere v. Earl of Whancliffe, 13 Ch. D.
346 (1879); see Dankins v. Antrobus, 17 Ch. D. 615, 631 (1881). This
requirement seems to amount merely to a fair hearing upon due notice of
the charges preferred whether such is provided for by the by-laws of the
association or not. In Fisher v. Keane, supra, Jessel, M. R., said at 357:
"I am not aware of any authority that a committee.., can, without giving
him notice of the charge, convict a man of gross misconduct." See, WRIGHT-
XNGTON, op. cit. supra note 4, at 215, 217; KERR, INJUNCTIONS (5th ed.
1914) c. 19.
3 No attempt is here made to catalogue the various fact-situations the
totality of which make possible such a generalization, since it is believed
that such an effort, to be exhaustive, would unduly lengthen this discussion.
9 Brandreth v. Lance, 8 Paige 24 (N. Y. 1839) ; Chappell v. Stewart, 82
-Md. 323, 33 Atl. 542 (1896); see Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swanston 402, 426
(1818); BISPHAM, PRINCIPLES OF EQuITY (10th ed. 1922) 584, n. 2.
10 See articles by: Long, Equitable Jurisdiction to Protect Pcrsonal
Rights (1923) 33 YALE LAW JOURNAL 115; Chafee, The Progress of the
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many cases where the courts have protected membership in vol-
untary associations, it is not intended here to assert that the term
"property right" is a mere label in all cases. The economic
factor is often very substantial. Thus membership in a stock
exchange or trade association 21 or chamber of commerce 1- may
be an important element in one's business. Protection of it as a
"property right" cannot be questioned. Likevise, with the
highly developed organization of labor into trade unions, mem-
bership in one of them is almost a necessity in order to obtain
employment.13 In these cases, the difficulty of protecting the
member's reputation as such does not arise, since it is preserved
along with the "property right," but this can be no reason for
saying that the personal interest is undeserving of protection
independently, or that its presence did not appeal to the court
along with the economic factors. 4 Membership in benevolent or
protective associations is universally protected. Here the right
Law, 1919-1920 (1921) 34 HArv. L. REV. 38, 407-415; Pound, Eqzlitable
Relief Against Defazatior and Inj.ries to Pcrsonality (191G) 29 HLARv.
L. REv. 640. Dean Pound suggests (at p. 641) that the limitation rests on
nothing more than "unintelligent adherence to the dicta of a great judge
in the pioneer case.' (referring to Gee v. Pritchard, eupra note 9). Also
see (1925) 25 CoL. L. REV. 373; (1924) 37 HARV. L. REV. 770; (1925) 38
HARv. L. Ruv. 396.
11 Quentell v. N. Y. Cotton Exchange, 56 Misc. 150, 100 N. Y. Supp. 228
(Sup. Ct. 1907); Ryan v. Cudahy, 157 I1. 108, 41 N. E. 700 (1895);
Strong v. Minneapolis Automobile Trade Ass'n, 151 Mlinn. 400, 13G N. W.
800 (1922) ; see People v. N. Y. Prod. Exch., supra note 4, at 409, 44 N. E.
at 85; Farmer v. Kansas City Board of Trade, 73 Mo. App. 557, 504 (1893).
See State v. Milwaukee Chamber of Commerce, 47 Wis. G70, 682, 3
N. W. 760, 764 (1879).
1" Bricklayers P. & S. Union v. Bowen, 183 N. Y. Supp. 185 (Sup. Ct.
1920); Gilmore v. Palmer, supra note 6; Dingwall v. Amalgamated As'n
of Street Ry. Employees, 4 Cal. App. 565, 88 Pac. 597 (1906); Spayd v.
Ringling Rock Lodge, supr note 6; Weiss v. Musical Union, 189 Pa. 440,
42 AtI 118 (1899); see (1920) 30 YALE LAW JOURNL 202. As to an
action for damages for wrongful ex\pulsion, see (1924) 33 YA= Lw
JOuRNAL 784; (1924) 24 COL. L. REV. 551. An employers' association,
likewise, involves an important factor in a member's business position.
Grassi Bros. v. O'Rourke, supra note 7.
14 That the courts have in mind also the personal interests of the parties
concerned is often apparent. Thus it is said in Dingvall v. Amalgamated
Ass'n of St. Ry. Employees, supra note 13 at 569, S3 Pac. at 599:
"Membership in a social or benevolent association is in itself a perzonal
right, especially when the purposes of the association include the ameliora-
tion or improvement of conditions under which members obtain their liveli-
hood, and the holder of such a right is entitled to be protected ... against
any unauthorized act or proceeding.... by which his enjoyment of such
right will be impaired or destroyed." And see Chafee, op. cit. supra note
10, at 414, n. 104, where the case of Bricklayers P. & S. Union v. Bowen,
and Gilmore v. Palmer, both supra note 13, are included among "recent
cases . . . important in connection with equitable jurisdiction to protect
interests of personalty."
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of members to receive certain pecuniary benefits gives the courts
an economic peg on which to hang their jurisdiction.' This
right is doubtless the true reason for the decision in situations
where the social elements are negligible, 6 but in many of these
organizations, especially those fraternal in character, the social
relations afforded by membership may be of great consequence
and expulsion may entail a severe blow to personal prestige.
Thus, when an expelled member of a fraternal organization is
reinstated, it seems clear that the stressing of the economic
factor is often merely a veil covering the true objective-the
protection of personal interests. In a recent case 17 the Supreme
Court of Connecticut said: "Expulsion from membership in a
fraternal society affects the property rights of the member and
it may- affect his reputation seriously." In another case,18 re-
instatement was ordered where the only damage alleged was to
social position and reputation. And again, the Texas Court of
Civil Appeals 19 did not stop to discover any "property right" but
35 Connally v. Masonic Mut. Ben. Ass'n, supra note 3; Froelich v. Musi-
cians Mut. Ben. Ass'n, 93 Mo. App. 383 (1902); Von Arx v. San Francisco
Gruetli Verein, supra note 7; Universal Lodge v. Valentine, supra note 7.
16 Horgan; v. Metropolitan Mut. Aid Ass'n, 202 Mass. 524, 88 N. E. 890
(1909); Hanson v. Mayers, 243 Mass. 25, 136 N. E. 821 (1922); Kulborg
v. National Council, 124 Minn. 437, 145 N. W. 120 (1914).
17 Gervasi v. Societa Guiseppi Garibaldi, 96 Conn. 50, 112 Atl. 693, 696
(1921). The social element seems to be very prominent in most cases
involving fraternal orders and lodges such as Gardner v. East Rock Lodge,
96 Conn. 198, 113 Atl. 308 (1921), noted in (1922) 31 YALm LAW JOURNAL
328; Universal Lodge v. Valentine, supra note 7; Pound, op. cit. supra
note 10, at 677, n. 106.
Is Most Worshipful United Grand Lodge v. Lee, 128 Md. 42, 96 Atl. 872
(1916). The damage was alleged as follows: ". . . that the acts of the
officials . . . have caused him great annoyance, inconvenience and damage
in that his suspension, although wholly unwarranted has resulted in him
being avoided by his fellow masonic brothers and a stigma has been
attached to him by virtue of the action .. .wherefore your orator has
been greatly damaged and injured among his neighbors, friends, relations,
and business associates and otherwise grievously damaged and injured."
19 Willis v. Davis, 233 S. W. 1035, 1037 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921), where
the court said: ". . . Courts will not interfere with the decisions of volun-
tary associations . . . where no property rights are involved except to
ascertain whether or not the proceeding was in good faith .. ." (italics
ours).
See Zeliff v. Knights of Pythias, 53 N. J. L. 536, 538, 22 At. 63, 64
(1891), where the court distinguishes between purely disciplinary cases
and those where the member appeals to the court for the protection of
property rights. It there goes on to say that in those involving only disci-
pline "the courts will not interfere against the decision of the members of
the club . . unless it can be shown that the rules are contrary to natural
justice . . . or refused to give the member a hearing" (and cites Dawkins
v. Antobus, supra note 7, which involves a purely social club). The New
Jersey Supreme Court in Stahl v. Romanian Young Men's Ass'n, 77 N. J.
L. 380, 71 Atl. 1114 (1909), ordered a new hearing to be given to an
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asserted its power to investigate the good faith of the proceed-
ings regardless of the existence of this element.
In cases involving purely social organizations, courts have
acted upon the basis of a still more scanty "property right." O
The English courts have reinstated members wrongfully expelled
from their clubs where the only property right was an indirect
one in the club buildingl-  And some courts have frankly pro-
tected the interests of membership without searching for such a
requirement.2 2  The following words of an early New York
Court 2- are worthy of note:
expelled member, saying that while courts ordinarily left matters of disci-
pline to associations, here the action cannot be called disciplinary.20 In Evans v. Philadelphia Club, 50 Pa. 107 (1805), the court said a
member could not be unjustly deprived of his "vested interest" in the club
property. And in Stein v. Malis, 44 Mlisc. 140, 89 N. Y. Supp. 921 (Sup.
Ct. 1904), the court rather vaguely mentions "rights of property" which
seem to be no more than those a member of any social club has in the club
property.
2oin Baird v. Wells, 44 Ch. D. 661 (1890), it is true that the court
refused to act because the club owned no property but it asserted its
willingness to take jurisdiction if a club owned such property as a house
or furniture for use of its members. And where the club owned property,
members expelled without notice were promptly reinstated. Fisher v.
Keane, supra note 7; Labouchere v. Earl of Wharneliffe, smpr, note 7;
Dawkins v. Antrobus, supra note 7; Young v. Ladies Imperial Club, Ltd.
[1920] 2 K. B. 523; D'Arcy v. Adamson, 29 T. L. R. 3G7 (1913). That in
such cases the reputation of the member is the true object of protection is
apparent. Thus in Fisher v. Keane, supr, note 7, it was said at 362:
"They ought not . . . according to the ordinary rules by which justice
should be administered by committees of clubs ... to blast a man's reputa-
tion forever, perhaps to ruin his prospects for life, without giving him an
opportunity of either defending or palliating his conduct." And in D'Arcy
v. Adamson, supra, the court said at 368: "The power of expulsion was a
highly penal power, the exercise of which might inflict a stigma upon an
individual, the results of which it was impossible to forsee, and it was an
essential condition to the exercise of that power that the accused person
should not be condemned or punished unheard?'22 Stat v. Cateret Club, s pra note 4; Cheney v. Ketcham, 5 Ohio N. P.
139, 144 (1898) (where it was said that if the organization were of a
business nature where only property rights were involved, an action for
damages would be a sufficient remedy but that "in this case, however,
where the benefits to be enjoyed are not determinable by any rules which
could be given to the jury to fLx their money value," the legal remedy was
inadequate and an injunction insuring membership was to be issued);
People v. Hoboken Turtle Club, 38 N. Y. St. fRep. 4, 14 N. Y. Supp. 76
(Sup. Ct. 1891); Sleepier v. Franklin Lyceum, 7 R. I. 523 (1807); Barry
v. The Players, 147 App. Div. 704, 132 N. Y. Supp. 59 (1st Dept. 1911),
aff'd 204 N. Y. 669, 97 N. E. 1102 (1912); People v. Uptown A~zo-
ciation, 26 App. Div. 297, 49 N. Y. Supp. 881 (2d Dept. 1893). In Willis
v. Davis, supra note 19, a member of a fraternal society was reinstated
because his expulsion was in bad faith. And in Burn v. National Amalga-
mated Laborers' Union [1920] 2 Ch. 364, a member of a union was restored
to membership and his office therein because his removal was without a
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"It is a general principle, affecting all proceedings which may
result in loss of property, position, or character . . ., that
he shall be first heard by the board or tribunal considering his
case before that body shall be legally permitted to pronounce his
condemnation." (Italics ours)
Other courts, while refusing to act because the facts showed
no irregularity of procedure, have expressly stated their will-
ingness to examine such matters.24
Expulsion from a religious organization presents a very analo-
gous situation. With a wholesome respect for the decisions of
church bodies in matters purely ecclesiastical, the courts refuse
to review the merits of a ruling involving the doctrines and disci-
pline ordinarily necessary to internal harmony. 2* But to prevent
an abuse of this discretion, the courts, as in the case of other
voluntary associations, may inquire into the jurisdiction and pro-
cedure of religious tribunals. Thus courts have looked to see if
the tribunal was properly endowed with authority to expel a
member 20 and have demanded a fair hearing on due notice."1
hearing and contrary to "natural justice." See (1920) 30 YALa LAW
JOURNAL 202.23 Loubat v. LeRoy, 40 Hun 546, 551 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. 1886) (restoring
member to good standing in the Union Club of New York City).
24 Commonwealth v. Union League, supra note 3; People v. Columbia
Club, 15 N. Y. Supp. 821, (Sup. Ct. Sp. T. 1891); People v. Manhattan
Chess Club, 23 Misc. 500, 52 N. Y. Supp. 726 (Sup. Ct. 1898).
25 Grosvenor v. United Soc. of Believers, 118 Mass. 78 (1875); Iglehart
v. Rowe, 20 Ky. L. Rep. 821, 47 S. W. 575 (1898); Canadian Religious
Association of North Brookfield v. Parmenter, 180 Mass. 415, 62 N. E. 740
(1902). It was here said by the court in the last of these cases at 421, 62
N. E. at 742: "If the action was regular ... the action of the association
was final, and chnnot be revoked or reversed in a collateral proceeding
merely for the reason that the evidence produced at the hearing does not
show that the members were in fact guilty . . . The courts in such cases
are not appellate tribunals .. ." And see Harmon v. Dreher, Spears Eq.
87, 121 (S. C. 1843); Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679, 729 (U. S. 1871).2 ; Bouldin v. Alexander, 15 Wall. 131 (U. S. 1872) ; Hatfield v. DeLong,
156 Ind. 207, 59 N. E. 483 (1901) (enjoining expulsion of members by
tribunal not organized in conformity with the church).
27Jones v. State, 28 Neb. 495, 44 N. W. 658 (1890); West Koshkonung
Congregation v. Otteson, 80 Wis. 62, 49 N. W. 24 (1891); Hendryx v.
Peoples United Church, 42 Wash. 336, 84 Pac. 1123 (1906); Holcomb v.
Leavitt, 124 N. Y. Supp. 980 (Sup. Ct. 1910); Barton v. Fitzpatrick, 187
Ala. 273, 65 So. 390 (1914); Gray v. Christian Society, 137 Mass. 329
(1884) (where it was said, per Holmes, J.: "The questions to be decided
are judicial in character, to be determined by the society after giving the
member notice and an opportunity to be heard. The necessity of comply-
ing with these requirements of common justice has been so uniformly
asserted, that few cases need be cited . . .")
Some courts have carried the policy of not interfering with religious
tribunals to the extent of refusing to inquire into the procedure, a view
which seems based upon a fear that the civil courts might become the
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Here again, however, the nature of the interests involved, and
the language of the courts would seem to indicate that the social
position and the good name of the member are the real objec-
tive of the protection extended to membership. A question sim-
ilar to that of expulsion is often raised where the majority of a
congregation decides to change the doctrines or af iliations of
the church and closes the doors to a dissenting minority. Courts
have refused to recognize as conclusive such actions when irregu-
lar, and have restored the minority to the use of the church
because of their valuable property right in the church buildings
held in trust for the congregation. 5 It would seem that this is
one instance where the stimulus that motivates the court is the
economic significance of the interests of the expelled members.
Another situation is that where an arbitrarily expelled member
brings suit to prevent a threatened diversion of the church prop-
erty. Here again the courts have declared the expulsion
invalid.2 1 Such decisions have been interpreted as holding that
civil courts will not accept as conclusive the decision of a church
tribunal if a "property right" be involved. With this in mind it
has been a natural step for some courts to say that they are
helpless to assist the plaintiff unless a "property right" be in-
volved3 ° Such a doctrine seems undesirable, particularly in view
final arbiters on all church matters. Nance v. Busby, 91 Tenn. 003, 18
S. W. 874 (1892); Shannon v. Frost, 3 Ky. 253 (1842); see Harmon v.
Dreher, swpra note 25, at 121; Watson v. Jones, supra note 25, at 733.
28 Canadian Religious Association v. Parmenter, supra note 25; Cape v.
Plymouth Church, 117 Wis. 150, 93 N. W. 449 (1903); West Koshkonong
Congregation v. Otteson, supra note 27; Kemarynsky v. Popovich, 218
Mich. 481, 188 N. W. 386 (1922); Mattison v. Saastamoinen, 160 Blinn. 173,
209 N. W. 648 (1926); Lindstrom v. Tell, 131 Binn. 203, 154 N. W. 969
(1915) (trust need not be express). The court in the last case also says,
at 207, 154 N. W. at 971: "no majority, even though it embrace all mem-
bers but one, can use the . . . property for the advancement of a faith
antagonistic to that for which the church was established.. .1 Where a
church owned no property, the court refused so to act. Fuszell v. Hail,
233 Il. 73, 84 N. E. 42 (1903). On cases of this character, see (1926)
39 HARv. L. Rmy. 1079; (1922) 31 YALn LAW JounNA, 329.
2 9 Hendryx v. Peoples United Church, supra note 27; Gray v. Christian
Society, supra note 27, at 331, where it is said per Holmes J. (after saying
that a fair hearing upon due notice must be given the member in question) :
".. only a few cases need be cited, ... to show how unwilling court3 have
been to admit that charters, by-laws, or rules could be intended to de-
prive a man of his membership without a hearing." That t:o of the four
cases cited by Mr. Justice Holmes for this proposition are Fizher v. Keane,
supra note 7, and Innes v. Wylie, 1 Car. & K. 257 (1814), both concerned
with social clubs, would seem significant in indicating that any "property
right" is far from the court's mind as a reason for declaring the e:pulsion
unwarranted.
30 See cases infra notes 32 and 33. For a general discussion of the con-
clusiveness of decisions by ecclesiastical tribunals, see Note (1927) 13 1'%.
L. R v. 400.
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of the doubtful character of the "property right" when one is
found. The cases concerned with individual expulsions from
church membership present more frankly the usual interests
incidental to "membership. Thus it has been held that only per-
sonal interests are involved and that these afford no ground on
which a court can take jurisdiction.3 1 Other courts have said
that they will not act if no economic loss be alleged in addition
to the deprivations incidental to loss of membership32 But
where a religious society offered small sick benefits and a right
to burial ground, a member was reinstated, 3 and where members
were eligible for the position of church trustees the court acted
"to prevent a deprivation of membership where property rights
fall with expulsion." 34 Other courts, furthermore, have acted
without requiring any economic injury as a basis for jurisdic-
tion 3- and, in so doing, have clearly protected the social position
of a church member. The following words of the Supreme
Court of Indiana are significant:
31 Landis v. Campbell, 79 Mo. 433 (1883) ; Waller v. Howell, 20 Misc. 236,
45 N. Y. Supp. 790 (1897); State v. Cummins, 171 Ind. 112, 85 N. E.
359 (1908) (denying a writ of mandamus to irregularly expelled member
because "the only relationship disclosed by the pleadings was of a spiritual
and ecclesiastical .nature"); Carter v. Papineau, 222 Mass. 464, 111 N. 1.
358 (1916); (1916) 29 HARv. L. RBv. 560. The suggestion has been made
that church membership and rights in church property are indivisible.
See (1923) 71 U. PA. L. REV. 161.
32 Minturn v. Leavell, 297 S. W. 615 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927); Gibson v.
Singleton, 149 Ga. 502, 101 S. E. 178 (1919); Kauffman v. Plank, 214 Ill.
App. 306 (1919) (refusing reinstatement and saying at 310 that even "if
tyranny, force, fraud, oppression or corruption prevail, no civil remedy
exists for such abuse except where it trenches on some property right.
the sole objective of the bill is to restore the plaintiff to membership.")
33 People v. Erste Kranken Verein, 56 Misc. 304, 106 N. Y. Supp. 922
(Sup. Ct. Sp. T. 1907).
34 Holcomb v. Leavitt, supra note 27. The "property rights which will
fall with expulsion" are not again mentioned or particularized and can
be nothing in addition to the use of the church property which any member
of a church has. No suggestion is found in the opinion that the expectancy
of obtaining "legal title" to the church building if elected trustee was the
property right involved. Here, and in Katz v. Erste Verein, supra, note
33, the courts take great pains to profess their inability to protect "personal
rights" as such, but both speak of "property rights" and proceed to protect
personal ones.
35Jones v. State, supra note 27; Hughs v. North Clinton Baptist Church
of East Orange, 75 N. J. L. 167, 67 Atl. 66 (1907) (ordering writ of
alternate mandamus to reinstate member summarily deposed by pastor);
Taylor v. Jackson, 273 Fed. 345 (App. D. C. 1921) (where, in reinstat-
ing a member who had not received sufficient notice of the charges against
him, the court said: "no temporal rights being involved, inquiry must be
confined to examining the rules of the church organization to see if there
has been substantial compliance with them"); Hatfield v. DeLong,
supra note 26.
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"As an unlawful expulsion would affect appellant's standing
in his community, and accomplish an injury for which there is
no adequate remedy at law, injunction is the proper remedy." -1
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and the Court of Appeals
of the District of Columbia, although precluded from acting by
the facts presented, have expressly asserted their willingness to
go just as far.37
It would seem, therefore, that if by "property right" is meant
an interest of significant economic value, the courts do protect
interests outside of this category. It is unfortunate that the
true stimulus motivating the court in such cases is often ob-
scured by reference to a "property right." Such a technique can
only create confusion in precedent and make more difficult the
task of predictability.
36 Hatfield v. De'Long, supra note 26, at 212, 59 N. E. at 485. And
compare the somewhat different attitude of the Nebraska Supreme Court
in Jones v. State, supra note 27, at 499, 44 N. W. at 659: "a church society
is founded for the.. . spiritual welfare of its members by admonition and
example... The right of membersip is a valuable privilege of which no
one should be debarred except for adequate cause shown ... after a fair
examination of the charge after due notice."
37 U. S. v. First Colored Baptist Church, 13 F. (2d) 296 (App. D. C.
1926). There the court said expressly that membership involved no tem-
poral rights and that the decision of the church was conclusive if it acted
within its jurisdiction (italics ours). The procedure was then examined
and found to be regular, so the bill was dismissed. In McDowell v.
Wilson, 252 Pa. 91, 97 Atl. 100 (1916), in refusing to review the expulsion
proceedings because the plaintiff had been deprived of a church offico
thereby, and had overlooked his remedy of quo warranto, the court said at
95, 97 AtI. at 101, that it would not act "not because of any lack of jurisdic-
tion to inquire whether the church court acted within the limits of its
authority and observed its own forms and rules of proceedings. The
courts of Pennsylvania have ample jurisdiction for inquiry of this nature."
